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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
By M\4ORRIS B. ABRAMI*
This has been a year of highly important constitutional decisions affecting Georgia. The federal courts have dealt with the County Unit System' and a municipal movie censorship statute. ' The Georgia Supreme
Court has had occasion to pass upon the recent Re-registration Law, in
3 and upon racial exclusion from juries in Crumb v.
Franklin v. Harper,
4
State. A score of other interesting and important matters have been decided.
TIlE COUNTY UNIT CASE

The Supreme Court, in South v. Peters, made short shift of an appeal
from a divided three judge District Court. The court in a 7-2 decision affirmed the lower court without a hearing. The majority decision apparently
was based on the court's equity discretion and the operative opinion was
contained in one sentence:
" ...Federal Courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers in
[a] case posing political issues arising from a state's geographical distribution
of electoral strength among its political subdivisions." [Emphasis supplied.]

While citing the now famous Colegrove v. Green,5 MacDougall v.
Green,6 and Wood v. Broom7 cases, the court did not rule the county unit issue a non-justiciable political question, nor did it specifically find that a decree of relief in the county unit case would pose the practical problems mentioned in the Colegrove and MacDougall cases.
The court simply said that it consistently withheld its equitable powers
in cases of a similar type to the county unit complaint.
The minority adopted the reasoning of the dissenting District Judge
Andrews, issued a blistering indictment of the inequities of the system and
reasoned carefully the believed distinctions between the county unit case
and those authorities relied on by the majority.
Whatever the merits of South v. Peters, one thing is undeniable: In the
Colegrove, MacDougall and all the other cases cited by the court, the relief prayed for was denied because the granting of it would have conflicted
with some well-established legal or equitable principle. In each case the
court announced why relief was denied. None of the "whys" announced in
those cases were reasoned by the court to apply in South v. Peters.
Certainly the majority did not attempt to meet or answer the logic of
*Associate of the firm of Heyman, Howell and Heyman, Atlanta; A.B., 1938; University of Georgia; B.A., 1948, Oxford; J.D., 1940, University of Chicago; Coauthor, How to Stop Violence! Intimidation! in Your Community with Alexander
F. Miller; Member American and Georgia Bar Associations.
U.S ........
70 S.Ct. 641, 94 L. Ed. 559 (1950).
1. South v. Peters,. .....
2. RD-DR Corp. and Film Classics, Inc. v. Smith, 89 F. Supp. 596 (N.D. Ga. 1950),
aff'd 183 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1950).
3. 205 Ga. 771, 55 S.E.2d 221 (1949).
4. 205 Ga. 547, 54 S.E.2d 639 (1949).
5. 328 U.S. 549, 66 S.Ct. 1198, 90 L. Ed. 1432 (1946).
6. 335 U.S. 281, 69 S.Ct. 1, 93 L. Ed. 3 (1948).
7. 287 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct. 1, 77 L. Ed. 131 (1932).
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the minority. The one-sentence county unit decision is really a very sweeping pronouncement of equity discretion. It stands without any assistance
from Colegrove v. Green, MacDougall v. Green and Wood v. Broom.
The one-sentence ruling is actually a statement of circumstance. The
statement that X State has never electrocuted a woman is also a statement
of circumstance. But that fact, however true, is no binding authority precluding the-infliction of that punishment in the appropriate case.
Students of the county unit problem will no doubt continue to be plagued
by that elusive constitutional phantom-the issue of the political (and thus
non-justiciable) question.
In no related case has the Supreme Court ever held the county unit type
of issue to pose a political question. Even if South v. Peters were not so
easily distinguished from the Colegrove case, that earlier landmark (if it
means anything) stands authentically, 4 to 3, for the proposition that the
issue of congressional districting is justiciable and non-political.
The county unit problem is essentially a voter disfranchisement question.
Disfranchisement may not be accomplished racially,' arbitrarily' nor fraudulently. ° It has not been so far suggested, but altitude of residence would
probably be no more arbitrary a test for franchisement than geography of
residence.
"Where constitutionality has been corsidered under the equal protection
clause, the court has inquired whether, with reference to a valid legislative
end, the statutory distinction had a rational basis in genuine differences between the groups affected. In each instance, the restliction or the classiication
must be reasonably related to a legitimate purpose."" I Emphasis supplied.]

As a voter disfranchisement issue, the county unit system is not a "political question." Political questions are really those matters of governmental
wrongs which in a democracy can be and are dealt with by the voters to
whom political authority is answerable. The judicial remedy is not available in those cases of alleged misrule, nor is the judicial remedy really necessary. Given the ballot, the citizen can take care of himself. But he must
first have the free and equal ballot. And his right to' that,
though it per2
tains to politics, does not pose a "political question. '
It remains to be seen whether some future court will choose to exercise
its equitable discretion to decide the substantive issues in the county unit
system-or whether outside equity, less drastic relief may be granted in a
case where the issue is made at law.
One must never forget that the Georgia County Unit System was grafted
onto Tennessee political growth. But the Tennessee Supreme Court cut
it down in an unanimous opinion very early after the transplantation. 3
THE REGISTRATION ACT
Another franchisement case, Franklin !v. Harper, was decided recently
8. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987 (1943).
9. Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949), aff'd 336 U.S. 933, 69 S.Ct. 749,
93 L. Ed. 1093 (1949).
10. Ex pairte,Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 S.Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1883).
11. 49 COL. L. Rzv. 629, 636 (1949).
12. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 47 S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759 (1926).
13. Gates v. Long, 172 Tenn. 471, 113 S.W.2d 388 (1938).
14. 205 Ga. 779, 55 S.E.2d 221 (1949).
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by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The issue arose in a mandamus action
and posed in the Supreme Court the issue of the constitutionality of the
Voters Registration Act of I949" and whether this could be questioned in
a mandamus proceeding. The court did not doubt the propriety of mandamus and this seemed scarcely questionable. The constitutionality of the
Voters Registration Act is, however, a more complicated matter. The Supreme Court, under the rule of Miller v. Head,'" considered only the question of whether the act was invalid as a whole, for the demurrers below
did not attack specific provisions of the act as contravening specific requirements of the State and Federal Constitutions. The decision in the case
carefully warned that the ruling as to the overall validity "is not to be taken as an intimation that other separate portions may or may not be unconstitutional."
Learned authors have previously written in this Review their opinion
that the act was constitutional though they warned "that legislation which
is constitutionally sound can be unconstitutionally administered.""
There is some reason to believe, however, that under an attack aimed
at specific sections the act might encounter grave constitutional difficulties.
This seems so for the following reasonsThe act requires that the Reqistrar select a section of the Constitutions
of the United States or Georgia to be used in the literacy test," whereas
the Constitution of Georgia permits the voter seeking qualification by reason of literacy to qualify by reading and writing any paragraph of said Constitutions."° Thus, the act may deprive the voter of a right guaranteed him
by the State Constitution.
The act seems to permit the registrar to require that an applicant to
vote by reason of literacy do the following:
(i)
Copy the section from the written test, which is a clear adding of
the word "copy" to the statute;
(2) Take the section by dictation from the registrar and write the same
without reference to the printed word; or
(3) Write the section from memory, without dictation or copying.
These are the possible interpretations which have been given to the act
in actual administration. But the Constitution of the State" gives the applicant to vote by reason of literacy an absolute right to qualify by reason of
writing a section selected by the applicant, "when read to him" by the registrar. Furthermore, the section, as written, permits the registrar to recuire of one applicnat that he write from dictation-a much harder test
than the copying test, which is. as the court could judicially note, the present day requirement and practice in most places. This provision may be
violative of vested rights under the equal protection clauses of the Constitutions of Georgia and of the United States.
15. Ga. Laws 1949, pp. 1204-1227.
16. 186 Ga. 694, 198 S.E. 680 (1938).
17. O'Neal and Quarles, Some Significant Recent Georgia Legislation, 1 MERCER L. REV.
27,33 (1949).
18. Ga. Laws 1949, p. 1204 (§ 17).
19. GA. CONST. Art. II, § 1,1 4, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-704 (1948 Rev.).
20. Ibid.
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The act requires of an applicant to vote by reason of literacy that he
demonstrate to the registrar that he can read '!intelligibly."'" The word
"intelligibly" means, amongst other things, with comprehension and understanding. This introduces a subjective standard into the test, a standard
such as proscribed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Davis v.
Schnell.22 Furthermore, this standard exceeds that required by the Constitution of the State23 and is perhaps violative of he applicant's rights under
that Constitution. The act also introduces the subjective standard of legibility, which could render the act void for similar reasons.
The statute" provides for notice under the act. Such notice is an integral
part of the right of an applicant to qualify under the "understanding of the
duties of citizenship" sections of the act. The section reads:
"In cases arising under the preceding paragraph and in all cases arising
under this Act where the applicant or the voter as the case may be is required
to be served with a notice of a hearing, unless otherwise provided, said notice
shall specify a day not less than one, nor more than ten days after the date of
the notice. The notice may be served by mailing same to applicant or voter at
the address given on his application card. In the case of an application for registration, the official may hand the applicant a copy of the notice in person at
the time he applies for registration, and this service shall be sufficient. Th3
registrars, if present or in session at the time an application is filed, may
proceed to the examination of the applicant instanter and without notice."
[Emphasis supplied.]

This notice section must be considered in conjunction with Sections 32,
36 and 27 of the act. These sections declare that a voter already qualified
may upon motion of the registrars or upon challenge by a qualified voter,
have his registration revoked. Notice under these cancellation provisions
is the same as that provided in Section 20(3), the.one day minimum and
the ten day maximum.
Section 20 (3) opens up large areas for the exercise of arbitrary discretion and it seems to run afoul of a decision of the United States Supreme
Court, Lane v. Wilson,2 which hit at "onerous procedural requirements" in
registration.
The notice provision is an "onerous procedural requirement" even if the
registrars in all 159 counties could invariably be relied upon to grant the
ten day maximum notice to all. One will note that, under Section 20(3),
a voter who fails to appear on the designated day loses his voting right
for one whole calendar year. This may occur in a year of congressional or
gubernatorial elections, which may mean the qualified voter may forfeit
his right for four years to elect his governor or for six years to choose a
senator.
No matter how fairly administered, the act may drastically affect one of
the vital rights of citizenship.
One will also note that the sections concerned with notice absolutely bind
the registrar to give no more than ten days' notice.
The notice sections invest registrars with enormous discretionary powers and these appear to violate the equal protection requirements of the
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Ga.
See
See
Ga.
307

Laws 1949, p. 1204 (§§ 17, 30).
note 9 supr .
note 19 supra.
Laws 1949, p. 1204 (§ 20(3)).
U.S. 268, 59 S.Ct. 872, 83 L. Ed. 1281 (1938).
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Fourteenth Amendment. Under the act the registrars may give one man
one day notice; another ten. This discretion was placed with the registrar
presumably so that he may exercise the same. Yet the exercise of this dis26
cretion could result in a denial of equal protection.
A court might note judicially that the state has a large agricultural population; that at certain seasons of the year and at certain times in the seasons, depending upon weather, rural people are required to stay on the job.
Unfriendly registrars could absolutely disfranchise large segments of our
country people by choosing to send notices on the first day of a long rainy
spell. Such conduct, however reprehensible, is permitted and legal under
the act.
The Lane case, which has been previously referred to, arose out of the
following history: Oklahoma had tried a "'grandfathers' clause" to keep
the franchise on the same basis as it was prior to the Fifteenth Amendment. But the United States Supreme Court nullified the Oklahoma grandfathers' clause in Guinn v. United States," which decision was rendered
in 1915.

The legislature of Oklahoma resolved to circumvent this mandate of
the Supreme Court. So it passed a statute. This statute gave to all who
had voted in the last general election the right to vote thereafter. Then,
the legislature permitted all others, white and black, without any apparent
discrimination, to register. On its face, the statute looked fair. But it contained a grave fault-a defect on which it was to fall. In the language of
the United States Supreme Court, the would-be new registrants:
" .. .had to apply for
if qualified at that time,
absent from the county
sickness or unavoidable

registration between April 30, 1916, and May 11, 1916,
with an extension to June 30, 1916, given only to those
. . . during such period of time, or . . . prevented by
misfortune from registering . . . within such time."

This act by its terms contained not one word of discrimination, applied
e~ually to white and black, and involved no element of arbitrary discretion in any registrar, but it was held to violate the Fifteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court said:
"The Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination. It hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored race although the abstract right to
vote may remain unrestricted as to race." IEmphasis supplied.]

How did the Oklahoma statute compare with the Georgia Registration
Act?
Oklahoma
i. Gave 12 days for compliance.
Registrars had no power to set time for compliance; this was accomplished in statute.
3. Registrars had no discretion to vary the 12 days given for compliance.
4. Registrars could not move to cancel registration with one to ten days'
notice.
2.

26. See note 9 supra.
27. 328 U.S. 347, 35 S.Ct. 926, 59 L. Ed. 1340 (1915).
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Georgia
i.

Gives io days (maximum).
2.
Registrars may send notice setting time for compliance at their pleasure.
3. Registrars may in their discretion allow one or ten days for compliance.
4. Registrars on their own motion or upon challenge made by a qualified
voter may cancel a registration with one to ten days given for hearing.
The act, in setting up the requirement of answering ten of a series of
thirty questions to qualify under the "understanding of the duties of citizenship" section, adopted a test which clearly had no relevance to the standard
which the State Constitution has established. The answer to ten simple
questions which can be successfully taught to an average four-year-old
child does not establish that the applicant "understand[s]" the duties
and obligations of citizenship under a republican form of government. 8
And, in view of the legislative history of this act and the contemporary historical scene which preceded its passage (all of which the court may note
judically), it is apparent that these questions were not really enacted to test
any duties or obligations of citizenship. This section falls under the language in the Guinn case, where Chief Justice White wrote an opinion striking down an Oklahoma constitutional section "embodying no exercise of
judgment and resting upon no discernible reason other than that the purpose to disregard the prohibitions of the amendment [Fifteenth] by creating a standard of voting which on its face was in substance but a revitalization of conditions which when they prevailed in the past had been destroyed
by the self-operative force of the Amendment."
MOVIE CENSORSHIP

A fascinating constitutional issue is now wending its way from Georgia
towards a possible United States Supreme Court review in the case of
RD-DR Corp. and Film Classics v. Smith.2" It is a test case on movie
censorship. The ultimate decision may not come, for the Supreme Court can
very easily deny certiorari to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals where a scathing decision held that movies do not enjoy the constitutional guaranties of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Appellants, the producer and the distributor of the film "Lost Boundaries,"
sought unsuccessfully there and in the District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia to enjoin the ban of the Atlanta censorship on the
movie. Appellants contended that a 1915 ruling of the Supreme Court, in
Mutual Film Corp. v. IndustrialCommissioners of Ohio," that movies are
not constitutionally protected is no longer the law and that the Supreme
Court had recently said as much in United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc."1 They also contended that the specific grounds on which the Mutual
28.
29.
30.
31.

See note 19 supra.
89 F. Supp. 596 (N.D. Ga. 1950), aff'd 183 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1950).
236 U.S. 247, 35 S.Ct 393, 59 L. Ed. 561 (1915).
334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915, 92 L. Ed. 882 (1947).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

19501

case was based have all been overruled in the course of the last thirty-five
years.
Appellants further contended that Justice McKenna's decision in the
Mutual case was based on three considerations and that none of these are
today constitutionally relevant. Justice McKenna's grounds were:
( i ) The exhibition of motion pictures is a business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit. (But appellants show
that in Winters v. New York 2 the distributor of a horror magazine, who was engaged in business purely for profit, prevailed
in that case.)
(2)
That movies are shown to assembled audiences. (But, in
Terminiello v. Chicago33 the mischief in the speech wa-s-sptad to
a large and riotous audience.)

'

(3) That there is "a possibility of evil employment of films."
(But, in the Winters case, the court held invalid a statute prohiiting the destruction of magazines devoted principally to criminal deeds of blood, lust or crime.)
Primarily, appellants contended that movies in the thirty-five years since
the Mutual case have advanced from pure'shows and spectacles to a key
position in public opinion formation and idea dissemination.
NEGROES ON JURIES

The dubious status of movies under the First Amendment may be settled
within the year. - But the constitutional right of a Negro to a trial by a
jury from which members of his own race have not been systematically
ekcluded has been clear since i88o.
Last year, however, marked the first Georgia ruling based on the"i'88o
precedent of Neal v. Delaware.4 In Crumb v. State35 the court reversed a
conviction of a Negro where a timely challenge to the array of petit jurors
showed that although Negroes composed over half of the total population
of the county, none had been summoned for at least forty years. The remarkable feature of the case was that although the State offered no evidence to justify such an exclusion, the defendant's challenge was overruled
by the trial court.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CODE SECTION

I

IO-7o6

Another criminal case brought into consideration Code Section 1 Io-7o6.
This section authorizes a new trial when a conviction is based on perjury,
but it requires proof thereof by conviction. In Burke v. State" the defendant sought a new trial on the basis of an affidavit by a principal state
witness, who swore he had been induced to perjury by two prosecuting attorneys. The attorneys countered this with their affidavit of denial. There
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

333
337
103
205
205

U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665,92 L.Ed. 664 (1945).
U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 865, 1 MERcER L. REv. 114 (1949).
U.S. 370, 26 L. Ed. 567 (1881).
Ga. 738, 55 S.E.2d 125 (1949).
Ga. 656, 54 S.E.2d 350 (1949).

26
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is no question that a conviction by the state prosecutor's knowingly employing perjured testimony is a violation of due process."
The question in the Burke case was whether Code Section i 1o-7o6 satisfied the requirements of due process, inasmuch as it set up an invariable
requirement that conviction of perjury, and that alone, would be the basis
of a new trial.
The Supreme Court upheld the Code Section on the ground that it was
rooted in the state's power over rules of evidence. The court observed
that the rule produced the best and purest evidence of perjury.
While the court's decision will no doubt shut the door on many mischievous and time-consuming attempts to retry well-tried cases, still it has some
very serious flaws:
(i) Changes of testimony are not too likely, as they always open
the possibility of prosecution.
A person charged with a crime must be proved guilty beyond
(2)
a reasonable doubt, yet his freedom and life may rest ultimately on a perjuring witness being proved so beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Can one be accorded due process when his life and liberty depend on the difficult criminal conviction of another? Suppose the
witness is believed by civil standards (preponderance of evidence) to have perjured himself. Yet he will not be con~ricted and
his testimony will stand and no new trial may be granted.
(3) What if the perjurer flees and cannot be found for trial and
conviction; or suppose he dies?
(4) Actually, does a state have full power over its rules of evidence where vital federal rights are involved."
DELEGATED LEGISLATION

A number of cases have dealt with the delegation of legislative power;
such was the issue in .4tkins v. Manning,9 Briggs v. State," City of Pearson
v. Gliden Co.,4 and Glustrom v. State.42
The gist of these decisions is that administrative agencies must be allowed
power to make rules and regulations which deal in a somewhat legislative
way with matters too detailed for comprehensive treatment by the General
Assembly, but which are, nonetheless, important for the proper operation
of these state functions. This is not allowable when the delegation includes
the right to make regulations, the violations of which are punishable as
crimes. But one must distinguish between a criminal prosecution for the
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Mooney v. Halohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791 (1935) ; Whitman v.
Wilson, 318 U.S. 688, 63 S.Ct. 840, 87 L. Ed. 1083 (1943) ; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S.
213, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L. Ed. 214 (1942).
Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 49 S.Ct. 445, 73 L.Ed. 884
(1929).
206 Ga. 219, 56 S.E.2d 260 (1949).
80 Ga. Anp. 664, 56 S.E.2d 802 (1949).
205 Ga. 738, 55 S.E.2d 125 (1949).
206 Ga. 734, 58 S.E.2d 534 (1950).
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violation of an administrative regulation and a property condemnation
proceeding under such regulations. 3
EQUAL PROTECTION

The Supreme Court has, on several recent occasions, strongly supported
the idea of cpmpetitive free enterprise against restrictive measures adopted
by public authority.
In Moultrie Milk Shed, Inc. v. City of Cairo"' the plaintiff sought injunctive relief against an ordinance which prohibited the sale of milk within the city unless it had been pasteurized in Grady County. The protection
sought through equity was of property; so the court brushed aside the contention that it could not interfere with the enforcement of a criminal law.
The court vigorously asserted that the clear, and indeed only, purpose of
the act was to restrict competition-that no public health purpose was
served and no valid basis existed for'classification and discrimination.
While one has much respect for this decision, it will strve as an example
of the type of wide and specialized knowledge-some almost of legislative
character-which our courts must possess if they are to distinguish between
valid and invalid classification and discrimination. The Fourteenth Amendment, particularly the equal protection clause, is rapidly becoming what it
was probably intended to be-"the most sweeping of the three" clauses of
Section i of the Amendment. 5
In Redw4ne v. Southern Co.46 the court held that a domesticated corporation doing business in Georgia is entitled to the same exemptions as to its
property as if it were a Georgia corporation. The touchstone of classification is that while different classes of property may be taxed differently,
some classes belonging to different owners may not be
The court has obviously..struck at the essence of discrimination-a tax
based on who is the taxpayer.
THE TWENTY-FIRST AM'ENDMENT v. EQUAL PROTECTION

In two cases the Twenty-first Amendment was called into play. In
Capital Distributing Co. v. Redwine 7 and again in ltkins v. Manning4 8
the court gave overriding precedence to the Twenty-first Amendment. In
the Capital case it was held that a tax substantially higher on Georgia-produced wine made of foreign fruits as compared to the same made from
Georgia raw material is constitutional. The objection that the discrimination violated the equal protection clause and was a burden on commerce
was met by the ruling that the Twenty-first Amendment conferred upon
the state power sufficient to permit these circumstances. The decision is
in line with other authority, but one wonders whether the framers of the
Twenty-first Amendment intended that it be used to shield local liquor
manufacturers or farmers from national competition.
43. Compare Glustrom v. State, supra note 42, with Atkins v. Manning, supra note 39.
44. 206 Ga. 348, 57 S.E.2d 199 (1950).
45. K.N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 CoL. L. REV. 341
(1937).
46. 206 Ga. 377, 57 S.E.2d 194 (1950).
47. 206 Ga. 477, 57 S.E.2d 578 (1950).
48. 2C6 Ga. 219, 56 S.E.2d 260 (1949).
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SALARY RAISES DURING TERM OF COMMISSION

In several cases-Houlihan v. Atkinson" and Houlihan v. Saussy, ° to
name two- 1 the court dealt with the application of Article III, Section XI,
Paragraph I of the State Constitution.12 The court has consistently ruled
that the constitutional restriction against changing salaries of elective officers does not apply to salaries paid other than from the state treasury.
One of these cases dealt with a judge's salary as supplemented by the
county treasury. While one has the greatest sympathy with every move
to increase judicial salaries, he cannot help but feel that it is dangerous
to permit salaries to be changed during a currect commission. The constit-ution struck at an evil. This evil is present whether the salary-is increased
from one source or another. Salaries can also be decreased, let it be remembered.
CONCLUSION

There were other constitutional cases decided this past year. But no
general theory could be developed by the discussion of them all.
In truth, Constitutional Law is merely a specialized field of statutory interpretation, but one highly mixed with tremendous political and social
pressures'.
Most cases decided in the past year were merely extensions of controlling precedents.
The Supreme Court of Georgia is far more careful and regardful of
these precedents than the Supreme Court of the United States. But, of
course, Georgia sentiment is more closely knit on public questions than is
the national feeling, which is composed of diverse views over an area of
three million square miles.
49. 205 Ga. 720, 55 S.E.2d 203 (1949).
50. 206 Ga. 1, 54 S.E.2d 557 (1949).
51. Other cases on the subject are: Houlihan v. Heery, 205 Ga. 735, 55 S.E.2d 244
(1949) ; Houlihan v. MacDonell, 205 Ga. 731, 55 S.E.2d 241 (1949) ; Houlihan v.
Mulling, 205 Ga. 735, 55 S.E.2d 244 (1949) ; and Houlihan v. Ryan, 205 Ga. 734,
55 S.E.2d 243 (1949).
52. GA. CODE ANN. § 2-2301 (1948 Rev.).

